A critique of rational atheism and theism.

The New Atheist movement (Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris, etc.) has often described itself as that of critical thinkers and scientists, set out to show people how religious superstition is an obstacle to the expansion of human knowledge and the development of a morality grounded on human wellbeing, rather than on rewards and punishments that await us in the afterlife. Despite their atheism, they've all come to accept that they are not certain that there is no God or afterlife; thus, instead of arguing for the non-existence of God, they argue for the improbability of God's existence.

Their whole project is chiefly aimed at showing the incompatibility of religious belief with science, but also the inconsistencies of religious premises. It is understandable why they chose to tackle theistic Gods and give little attention to non-theistic Gods, since certain theistic beliefs are often a source of discrimination against nonbelievers (as I've shown in this article), and the identification of politicians with certain forms of theism is necessary for them to attain credibility and popularity. The arguments presented by their opponents (mostly Christian apologists, like William Lane Craig) have only facilitated their success, as they tend to be circular and dishonest. Let's remember one that they throw at atheists every time they can: [the Christian] God must exist because it's the only way for there to be objective morality. This argument gave rise to several questions apologists have failed to answer:

(1) How do we know morality is objective?;

(2) If we assume the existence of God and of objective morality (and therefore, of objective immorality), how do we know God is "good", and why is an "evil" God imperfect?;

(3) If we act "morally" because we are afraid of God's punishment or disapproval, isn't our morality rooted on human wellbeing, if we consider being subject to God's disapproval (or worse, going to hell) greatly diminishes it?;

(4) Assuming we are capable of knowing God's morals and follow them because they're "perfect" instead of doing it out of fear of punishment (which is already assuming a lot), can we expect human beings to act against their own wellbeing and that of their fellow men if God's moral code requires it? If not, why did God make human nature incompatible with anything that goes against its preservation and wellbeing?;

(5) If, like William Lane Craig, we believe God is good and kind because he's perfect, how did we know that goodness and kindness are elements of perfection before learning this from God (if the initial premise was that God is morally perfect, and the conclusion is that goodness and kindness come from God)?;

Ergo: Human morality does not come from God, and the existence of God does not logically follow from assuming the existence of objective morality. Even if we could assume the existence of God and his connection to objective morality, which theistic God to pick would remain a problem. The scientific reasons for the non-existence of theistic Gods are well known, and I won't elaborate about them here.

Now in the field of science, as I've mentioned above, the New Atheist movement did not argue for the non-existence of a non-theistic God, but for his/her/its improbability (in some interview, Richard Dawkins claimed he is a God agnostic in the same way he is an orbiting-teapot agnostic). Their argument is that one is never called to prove a negative, since the burden of proof is on the person that makes the claim. While this principle is very useful for scientific purposes, I find there is simply no truth value to negative statements, as some of these New Atheists recognize. But on what grounds, then, do they argue for the improbability of God?

Richard Dawkins, as the scientist he is, grounds his claim on the fact that complexity can only derive from simplicity through an accumulative process, and a being intelligent enough to create the universe would have to be the most complex being in existence. Since complex beings are more improbable than simple beings, God would have to be infinitely more improbable than the universe he created. I find his argument unconvincing, because any argument based on probability requires statistical data of past events. In Dawkin's own words, "the greater the statistical improbability, the less plausible is chance as a solution: that is what improbable means." I find three problems with his argument, namely:

(1) He assumes that the creation of the universe was a phenomenon comparable to any other in the post-creation universe, so the same rules should apply to this and any event. If we're basing our claims on empirical evidence and known natural processes, what empirical evidence and what natural processes do we know to exist in a pre-creation universe?

(2) We only know of the existence of one universe, so, given the lack of other statistical data, we can't draw conclusions about the probability of the universe or of its designer.

(3) Both theists and the New Atheists are working with the idea that the universe has an origin, ignoring that a case can be made for a universe without a cause or origin (e.g. Roger Penrose's theory), so the question "What is the origin of the universe?" ends up being a loaded question.

In conclusion, there is no standard I know of that allows us to assess the probability of God, so the only rational stance against the God question is agnosticism. One can be a deist (not theist) or an atheist as far as belief is concerned and stay true to reason, as long as we accept that our leaning to belief or non-belief are devoid of reason, and only respond to a gut feeling. As Carl Sagan once put it, "...I try not to think with my gut. Really, it's ok to reserve judgment until the evidence is in."